Abstract: This paper is concerned with supply chain competition and capacity optimization under the assumptions that consumer demands in both online and offline markets are relative to each other. It focuses on "leader-follower" game model under supply chain framework of "one strong traditional manufacturer and one traditional retailer whose status is weakest, one online manufacturer is an uprising star, and the strong traditional manufacturer competes with the online manufacturer in online markets". After that the paper analyses supply chain partners' optimal capacity decision and distribution by numerical analysis. Some conclusions could be found out as follows: Firstly, the appropriate offline market capacity can realize the strong traditional manufacturer's production cost minimize; Secondly, the retailer can avoid two manufacturers' capacity allocation excessive tilt to online market, however, this restriction capacity is limited, the retailer's competitive advantage has a upper limit; Thirdly, Industry capacity allocation proportion reaches the maximum somewhere, which suggests that the competitiveness of the up-rising online manufacturer gradually strengthen, and the increase of offline market capacity will go against the strong traditional manufacturer's maintain dominance of supply chain. Fourthly, the increasing of offline market capacity can improve consumer welfare, and the increasing of industry e-commerce development level will intensify three supply chain's competition; Finally, the excess capacity can be solved. The online manufacturer need pay much higher than the strong traditional manufacturer's online promotion effort to realize its revenue's significant improvement.
Introduction
At present, compared with Chinese offline entity economy's globalization dividend away, the demographic dividend decreasing, and the default payment for goods of some manufacturing enterprises, etc. Online markets are boom since 2012, which have been basically merged together with offline real economy. The digital consumption trend of the domestic consumer is fast-growing, buying fruit, snacks, shoes on Yihaodian, Taobao, going to Jingdong store to buy digital products, home appliances and buy books on Dangdang, etc., all of these consumption habits have been formed, online shopping has become a normal consumption. The report of China Internet Network Information Center in 2015 showed that, whether in personal computer port or mobile devices port, Chinese online shopping user attributes has already been close to entirely netizens. By the end of 2014, Chinese netizens' online shopping habits have already been formed. The prosperity of online markets have forced an implementation of online manufacturers, such as Tmall's many costume sellers, such as Liebo, Qigege, etc. Offline stores living space is greatly compressed, facing the fate of the transformation or reshuffle.
Kinds of traditional manufacturers try to intensify online marketing by channel and brand promotion ways, with some upstart online manufacturers compete for market share. Redistribution of industry production capacity is an emerging questions. About the conflict and coordination of online market 
Model Description and Analysis
It supposes that the manufacturer   1, 2 jj  sells homogeneous product  
1, 2 ii
, both of them compete on the internet at the same time. Being a weaker partner, the online manufacturer 2 M can have more rights in competition on the Internet through improving its promotion levels. Simultaneously, the strongest manufacturer 1 M still has a traditional retailer r whose status is weakest, it has to provide better services such as more comfortable shopping environments, closer places, etc. to keep its market share. The demands functions are decided not only by two manufacturers' pricing mechanisms, but also by their promotion effort levels, which are divided by two dimensions: channel promotion effort level M and online manufacturer 2 M play a leader-follower game to decide optimal variables. Secondly, being a weakest supply chain partner, the traditional retailer joins dual market competition. By backward induction, all of the optimal variables and revenues can be calculated in Table 1 . Accordingly, it can conclude some theorems and corollaries as follows:
Theorems 1 Under dual market competition, the condition that the traditional retailer r could exist is
Corollary 1 When Manufacturer 2
M is in second-rate predominance status, the higher the offline retailer's channel promotion level, the bigger its optimal revenues.
Corollary 2 When Manufacturer 2
M is in second-rate predominance status, the greater the offline retailer's purchase and sale price difference, the bigger its optimal revenues. Corollary 3 When Manufacturer 2 M is in second-rate predominance status, the greater the sales promotion effort level's difference between online and offline markets, the lower the offline retailer's optimal revenues.
Theorems 2 Under dual market competition, the condition that online manufacturer 2 could get optimally maximal revenues is p is positive correlation of the price w , on the contrary it is negative correlation.
Corollary 6 When Manufacturer 2 M is in second-rate predominance status, the brand promotion effort level of online manufacturer 2 M is irrelevant with all of optimal decision variables, except its optimal revenue By the way, all of the optimal variables are listed below in Table 1 . Some conclusions can be found out from Table 1. Firstly, brand promotion level does not influence every optimal variables except manufacturer 1 M and 2 M 's optimal revenues. Secondly, being a judgement condition, the F is only relevant with manufacturer 1 M 's promotion effort level. Finally, due to the offline retailer did not consider the problem such as store rent, which causes offline retailers will do the business at lower prices, in fact if taking into account the rent problem, the retailer's living space is little. if you need to support and encourage retailers to maintain the offline market, strong manufacturer 1 M should take corresponding measures such as subsidies, supply chain coordination problem can also be further analyzed. The model of supply chain coordination does not exist. Table 1 . Optimal variables of the model.
Numerical Simulation Analysis
With the improvement of industry e-commerce development level, the online market capacity change. New competitors to enter and product innovation breakthrough, all of which could also lead to offline market capacity change. How "Online market capacity rate g " and "offline market capacity r a " influence to decide the production capacity of the supply chain optimization decision? Basic parameter assumptions are as follows, M 's optimal production cost can't be reached. In the other hand, some conclusions can be made from the curve r D . The offline retailer's competitive ability is weakest, at the beginning the demand could become bigger as offline market capacity r a increasing, and the retailer restricts two manufacturers' capacity allocation is excessive tilt to online market, however, this restriction capacity is limited, in place of
